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NOTES
The draftsmen of the Civil Code of 1808 clearly intended to
reject the French doctrine of la possession vaut titre.21 It might
be argued that the draftsmen intended the prescription of three
years to be the sole measure of protection afforded the good faith
purchaser. However, while it is clear that this prescriptive
period applies to the case where the good faith purchaser ac-
quires the movable from one who has no title, it may be ques-
tioned whether this provision is intended to apply to the case
where the good faith purchaser acquires the movable from a
vendor who has a voidable title. Article 1881, which provides
that contracts made through error, fraud, or other vice of con-
sent are not null, but are voidable by the parties, has been inter-
preted to mean that a good faith third party purchaser is pro-
tected where his vendor has a voidable title.22 The question might
be raised whether to this extent the Louisiana Civil Code is con-
sistent with the common law bona fide purchaser doctrine. How-
ever this may be, it is clear today that the common law bona fide
purchaser doctrine is well entrenched in Louisiana law.
T. Wilson Landry
TORTS - ESCAPING PRISONERS - DUTY OF STATE TO THIRD
PERSONS
In the first of two recent cases' a fifteen-year-old inmate had
escaped from a state reformatory. Following his escape, he stole
an automobile which he negligently drove onto a public sidewalk,
injuring plaintiff. Plaintiff charged the state with negligence
in allowing the escape; but defendant's exception of no cause of
action was sustained by the district court. On appeal, held, af-
firmed. The institution's duty to restrain a convicted criminal
is not based on the purpose of protecting the general public from
all harms that might be inflicted by an escaping prisoner, and the
injury received was not one against which the state had a duty
to protect. The court bolstered its opinion by finding that the
acts of defendant in permitting the escape were not the proxi-
mate cause of plaintiff's injury. Green v. State, 91 So.2d 153
(La. App. 1956).
21. This intention is evidenced by the fact that the draftsmen adopted the
French Civil Code articles which immediately precede and follow the French
article establishing this doctrine (Article 2279), but omitted the latter article.
22. Gonsoulin v. Sparrow, 150 La. 103, 90 So. 528 (1921), a case involving
immovable property.
1. In both these cases the state allowed itself to be sued pursuant to LA. CONST.
art. III, § 35.
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In a second case decided on the same day by the same court,
suit was brought against the state for an injury inflicted by a
convict who had escaped from the state penitentiary at Angola.
The convict gained access to narcotics and a pistol. He then fled
into the nearby Tunica Hills, where he entered the home of plain-
tiff and, while under the influence of the narcotics, shot and
wounded plaintiff. There is no wall between the prison at
Angola and the adjoining Tunica Hills, which, because of its
rugged terrain, is employed as a buffer area where normally
escapees can be quickly apprehended with the aid of bloodhounds.
Plaintiff brought suit against the state and alleged negligence
on the part of the prison officials in permitting the escape and
in allowing the prisoner access to the narcotics and firearm. The
district court entered judgment for plaintiff. On appeal, held,
affirmed. The prison officials were negligent in their conduct
of the prison and in their control of the convict. This negligence
was the direct and proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. Webb
v. State, 91 So.2d 156 (La. App. 1956).
Frequently, the custodians of dangerous or incompetent per-
sons are held liable for negligently permitting their charges to
injure third parties.2 A parent is liable at common law for the
torts of his minor child when the parent's negligence makes the
injury possible." Those in charge of a person having a con-
tagious disease owe a duty to each member of the community to
prevent the spread of the disease.4 Similarly, officials of mental
institutions have been held liable for negligently allowing their
insane charges access to society.5 Because a school is the cus-
2. HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.7 (1956) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§ 316 (1934).
3. Ryley v. Lafferty, 45 F.2d 641 (D. Idaho 1930) (parent failed to correct
child's habit of bullying smaller children) ; Stewart v. Schwartz, 57 Ind. App. 249,
106 N.E. 719 (1914) (parent liable for failure to prevent child from stretching
rope across highway) ; Holverson v. Noker, 60 Wis. 511, 19 N.W. 382 (1884)
(parent liable when minor child scared horses on highway) ; 67 C.J.S., Parent
and Child § 66 (1950).
Louisiana imposes a vicarious liability on parents, holding them liable for the
torts of their children regardless of any fault of the parent. LA. CIVIL CODE art.
2318 (1870) ; Sutton v. Champagne, 141 La. 469, 75 So. 209 (1917) (parent held
liable when minor son negligently killed plaintiff's child with a rifle received from
a third playmate).
France places a legal presumption against the parent which can be rebutted by
showing he was free from fault in allowing his child to inflict tortious injury.
FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1384; AMOS & WALTON, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW
(1935) ; PLANIOL ET RIPERT, DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS § 631 (1952).
4. Smith v. Baker, 20 Fed. 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1884) (child with whooping cough)
Missouri K. & T. Ry. v. Wood, 95 Tex. 223, 66 S.W. 449, 56 L.R.A. 592, 93 Am.
St. Rep. 834 (1902) (delirious smallpox patient).
5. Jones Co. v. State, 122 Me. 214, 119 AUt. 577 (1923) (pyromaniac neg-
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todian of its students while they are in attendance, the school
may be held liable for the tortious injury of one student by an-
other when the school carelessly maintains unsupervised condi-
tions which enhance the possibility that such tortious conduct
will occur.6 Prison officials are held to a duty to afford reason-
able protection to one prisoner against injury by another pris-
oner ;7 this duty arises because the prisoner is forced into a group
known to be dangerous and yet he is divested of means to pro-
tect himself." But any legal duty of the custodians of prisoners
to protect the general public has generally been denied, the
courts usually applying the proximate cause concept that the
prisoner's tortious act constitutes an independent intervening
cause.9
In the instant cases the court was confronted with the policy
question of whether the state is to be held liable for injuries in-
flicted by escapees from penal institutions.10 Since the public
benefit demands the performance of large scale dangerous ac-
tivities of a nature which only government can undertake, the
courts have been reluctant to impose liability on the government
ligently released burned plaintiff's land) ; St. George v. State, 203 Misc. 340,
118 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Ct. C1. 1943) (failure to protect visitor to asylum from danger-
ous inmate). Louisiana, however, departs from the recent common law juris-
prudence in that no cause of action is allowed for negligence in the discretionary
acts of such officials. Cappel v. Pierson, 132 So. 391 (La. App. 1931) ("defend-
ant being vested with discretionary authority or powers of a quasi judicial nature
in releasing inmates of the institution, his good faith cannot be questioned").
6. Charonnet v. San Francisco School District, 56 Cal. App.2d 246, 133 P.2d
643 (1943) (leg of one pupil broken by another where only one teacher was as-
signed to supervise the school yard where 150 boys were playing many games) ;
McLeod v. Grant County School District No. 128, 43 Wash.2d 316, 255 P.2d 360
(1953) (rape of a pupil by fellow pupils in a darkened secluded room of gym-
nasium) ; 78 C.J.S., Schools, § 321 (1952).
7. St. Julian v. State, 82 So.2d 85 (La. App. 1955) (plaintiff's son killed by
paranoid who was put in same cell with him) ; Honeycutt v. Bass, 187 So. 848
(La. App. 1939) (plaintiff put in "run-around" with belligerent drunk) ; Hixon
v. Cupp, 5 Okla. 545, 49 Pac. 927 (1897) (official liable for "dangerous court").
But see Flaherty v. State, 269 N.Y. 342, 73 N.E.2d 543 (1947) (the state was
held not negligent in failing to prevent a reformatory inmate from pouring acid on
his cottage-mate at night).
8. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 320 (1934).
9. Thomas v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel and Coal Co., 144 Ala. 188, 39 So. 715
(1905) (leased convict shot a guard in escaping) ; Henderson v. Dade Coal Co.,
100 Ga. 568, 28 S.E. 251, 40 L.R.A. 95 (1897) (leased convict escaped and raped
plaintiff) ; Williams v. State, 308 N.Y. 548, 127 N.E.2d 545 (1955) (man died of'
fright when forced to drive escaping convict) ; Moss v. Bowers, 216 N.C. 546, 5
S.E.2d 826 (1939) (sheriff turned care of jail over to his daughter, inmate "made
love" to her and she released him and gave him a gun -no recovery when he
shot a storekeeper) ; State ex rel. Davis Trust Co. v. Sims, 130 W.Va. 623, 46
S.E.2d 90 (1947) (plaintiff recovered under a statute allowing recovery for moral
obligations of the state).
10. See Comment, Proximate Cause in Louisiana, 16 LOUISIANA LAW RE-
VIEW 391, 394 (1956) : "As a matter of policy liability cannot be imposed indis-
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for the careless performance of these functions.". In determin-
ing whether a defendant is to be held liable for the careless in-
jury of a plaintiff, courts ordinarily engage in a consideration
of the duty owed by defendant to plaintiff, or a consideration of
the doctrine of proximate cause. The basic question of policy re-
mains the same whichever of these two approaches the court
may choose to explain its decision.1 2 In the Green case the court
decided the policy question in favor of the state. Though part of
the decision was cast in terms of proximate cause, the court ex-
pressed its conclusion by stating that a penal institution owes
no duty to protect the general public against injury by an es-
capee. In reaching this decision the court reasoned that "a con-
victed person may be as dangerous on the day of his legal release
as he was on the first day that he was confined; thus the state
should be no more responsible for his misconduct during the
period of escape than after his release."'18 It would appear that
the court's decision was based upon an inquiry into the purposes
of penal institutions. While penal institutions serve several pur-
poses, only those which the court feels are most relevant to the
question of liability are weighed in reaching a decision. The con-
siderations influencing the court may be seen by contrasting
penal institutions with insane asylums, 14 which, as previously
seen, have been held liable for negligently permitting their
charges access to society. In penal institutions the inmates are
being punished and corrected, but they will be released on a
designated day regardless of the effectiveness of the correc-
tion.' 5 However, in an asylum the inmates are confined until
criminately for all consequences that follow a wrongdoing." That is, an initial
negligence, for this "would result in almost infinite liability for wrongful acts."
11. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955). (barge ran
aground when lighthouse not properly attended) ; Dalehite v. United States, 346
U.S. 15 (1953.) (reversed allowance of recovery for government's negligence in
handling the explosives in Texas City disaster) ; Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S.
49, (1949), (servicemen may recover for injuries received not incidental to their
service) ; National Mfg. Co. v. United States. 210 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1954) (neg-
ligent weather forecast) ; Bulloch v. United States, 13. F. Supp. 885 (D.C. Utah
1955) (injury, to sheep by nuclear activity),; Williams v. United States, 115, F.
Supp. 386 (D.C. Fla. 1953.) (experiment activity; defense secret) ; Bartholomae
Corp. v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 651 (D.C. Cal. 1955) (injury to ranch house
150, miles from. Nev.ada proving grounds).
12. See GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 132-77, (1927).
13. Green v. State, 91 So.2d 153, 155 (La. App. 1954),.
14. A similar contrast was made in Williams v. State, 308 N.Y. 548, 127,
N.E.2d 545 (1955).
15. For a coimprehensive discussion showing that prisoners are more dangerous
to society at the date of their legal release than on the day they were confinedbecause of their stay in prison, see SUTILFGAND, LRINCIPLES OF, CRIMINOLOGY
c. 22, (1947).
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such time as they are deemed fit to return to society. Thus in
regard to the purposive protection of the general public, there
is a decisive distinction between insane asylums and penal in-
stitutions.
The decision of the Webb case holding the state liable for
injury inflicted by the escaping convict is not inconsistent with
the position of the court in the Green case: in the Webb case spe-
cial circumstances were present which set plaintiff Webb apart
from the "general public." The state's use of the Tunica Hills
as a buffer area to maintain the security of the prison specially
exposed the group of people having their homes in that region
to the danger of injury by escaping convicts. 10 It is a well-recog-
nized principle of law that a danger imposed upon another gives
rise to a corresponding duty on the part of the imposer to pro-
tect the exposed person against the risk of injury arising from
that danger. An example of the operation of this principle was
previously seen in regard to a prison's duty to protect an inmate
against injury by a fellow-inmate. Whether plaintiff Webb and
the other residents of Tunica Hills were subjected to danger suf-
ficient to set them apart from the "general public" and to give
rise to a duty on the part of the prison to protect them against
injury from escaping convicts, is a matter which must rest in
the judgment of the court. It would appear that if the prison
carelessly permits a convict to escape into the Tunica Hills that
the state should be liable for injuries inflicted upon residents of
that region. It is to be noted, however, that the court's decision
in the Webb case was not predicated solely upon these circum-
stances. The culpability of the prison and the danger imposed
upon the residents of Tunica Hills was increased by the fact that
the prison allowed the escaping convict access to the narcotics
and firearm. Upon these combined factors, the court found that
a duty was owed to plaintiff Webb for the breach of which she
was entitled to recovery. The court expressed no opinion as to
what the decision might have been had some factor of this com-
bination not been present. Though the Webb case is one of the
first American decisions to allow recovery for injury caused by
an escapee from a penal institution, 17 the step which this case
takes in the expansion of the law is a small one due to the pecu-
16. During the year this prisoner escaped, 1953, there were 102 convicts that
tried to leave Angola by Warden Sigler's, count. Webb v. State, 91 So.2d 156 (La.
App. 1956).
17. One English case allowed recovery when an inmate with a particularly
bad escape record escaped from a "low security" reformatory, stole a car from
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liarity of the local situation and the aggravating factors in-
volved.
Philip E. Henderson
VALUATION OF STOCK IN CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS
FOR FEDERAL ESTATE TAXES
Petitioner brought action in the Tax Court to reduce the fed-
eral estate tax due on certain closely held corporate stock, valued
at $600.00 per share by the Commissioner in a deficiency deter-
mination. From the Tax Court's valuation of $375.00 per share,
petitioner appealed on the grounds that insufficient weight had
been given to the testimony of his expert witnesses whose valua-
tions were from $150.00 to $225.00 per share, and on the grounds
that the court had excluded evidence of a $200.00 per share estate
tax valuation of stock in the same corporation, which had been
made within seven months of the valuation under litigation. On
appeal, held, affirmed. The Tax Court is not bound by expert
testimony where there is substantial evidence in the record to
support its finding. A prior valuation of the same stock for one
taxpayer is not binding for another and is of little probative
force unless reached after a thorough investigation. Fitts Estate
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 237 F.2d 729 (1st Cir.
1956).
For federal estate tax purposes the value' of stock in a closely
held corporation is interpreted by the Treasury Regulations to
mean the fair market value of the stock at the valuation date.
Fair market value is defined as "the price at which property
would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller,
neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell" and is to be
determined only after a consideration of "all relevant facts and
elements of value as of the applicable valuation date."'2 The rel-
evant facts to be considered are set forth clearly in both the
the plaintiff who lived nearby, and damaged It in the get-away. Greenwell v.
Prison Commissioner, 101 L.J. News 486 (1951), 68 L.Q. REV. 18 (1951).
Also, as explained in note 9 supra, the Sin8 case allowed recovery on a moral
duty basis.
. 1. In the valuation of property to be included in the gross estate both the 1954
Internal Revenue Code and the 1939 Code use the term "value," not the term
"fair market value." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2031; INT. REV. CODE OF 1939i
811.
2. U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.10(a) (1942).
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